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Abstract 
This paper develops a political economy framework that determines the factors 
causing underinvestment in public research expenditures. Governments are unable to 
fully compensate for unequal income distribution effects of research because of either 
their inability to make credible commitments or ofdeadweight costs associated with 
compensation. 
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THE POLITICS OF UNDERINVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
Introduction 
Despite the very high productivity of research, a large literature reports severe 
underinvestment in public research expenditures for agriculture world-wide (Ruttan; Schultz; 
Huffman and Evenson). Several explanations have been put forward including imperfect infonnation 
of governments, difficulties in overcoming the particular nature of the 'publicness' of research 
(transaction costs), and free rider problems (spill-overs and spill-ins between countries or states 
within a country). Others have claimed that underinvestment may be overstated because studies 
ignore deadweight costs of taxation (Fox), the country's trade position and tenns of trade effects 
(Edwards and Freebaim), the difference between intennediate and finished products, the effects on 
unemployment (Schmitz and Seckler), or the increase in the deadweight costs of existing commodity 
policies (Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz).l 
This paper develops a political economy framework that detennines the political factors 
causing the apparent underinvestment in public research expenditures in agriculture. A key 
consideration is the unequal income distribution effects of agricultural research between sectors that 
leads governments to balance the political costs and benefits of diverging from each interest group's 
private optimum level of the public good investment. Each group may have a very different 
optimum for public research. Taking agriculture as an example, inelastic demand and elastic supply 
in industrial country agriculture may result in consumers benefiting relatively more than farmers 
(indeed, the latter can even lose). This income inequality generated by public research will lead to 
underinvestment, unless governments can fully compensate the group benefiting less. Full 
compensation will generally be impossible because of either the inability of governments to make 
credible commitments or of deadweight costs associated with the compensation. 
1 The excellent survey in USDA (1995) also argues that studies may ignore private research, lags in the effects of 
research, and potential environmental and health effects. 
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The dynamic effects of research on income distribution and the government's attempt to 
compensate through redistributive policy will inevitably lead to underinvestrnent. This is because 
the government cannot credibly commit to full compensation for unequal income effects ofresearch. 
This inability of current governments to credibly commit to compensation in the future (when the 
unequal distributional effects of research emerge) occurs even if non-distortionary lump-sum 
transfers are available for the redistributive policy. Partial compensation and the resulting reduction 
in political support prevents the government from choosing the social optimum level of research 
expenditures in agriculture. 
The inevitable existence of deadweight costs with redistributive policy automatically results 
in partial compensation. Even if governments could credibly commit to compensate for any income 
inequality due to research, deadweight costs of redistribution leads to underinvestment in research. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first present a simple dynamic model with both 
research and redistributive policy endogenous. After detennining the social optimum of a social 
planner optimizing a two-period Benthamite welfare function, we develop a public choice model. In 
comparing the political optimal policies to the social optimum, we derive the political factors 
described above that contribute to underinvestrnent in agricultural research. 
The Model 
Consider an economy with two sectors: agriculture (sector A) and industry (sector B). All 
individuals in the economy are assumed to have identical preferences, the same two-period time 
horizon, and perfect foresight. The problem facing each individual is to maximize a utility function 
V i. T' 
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[1] V; =2) 1-IU(y:) 
I=T 
•for individual I = A,B and time period T = 1,2. 8 is the discount factor, y: represents net income of 
individual i at time t and U(y;) is the (indirect) utility i derived from y:. Each sector has one 
representative individual with a pre-policy endowment income y;, which cannot be transferred 
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between periods. The government has two policy instruments affecting both the level and 
distribution of income in the economy: public research investments in agriculture and redistribution 
(through commodity policy or lump-sum transfers). 
Define aggregate public research at time t expenditures by 't I' The cost of raising taxes to 
finance research is shared equally between sectors and we assume no deadweight costs (or excess 
burden) of taxation. Benefits from research can only materialize in the next period (one period after 
the investment is made) and there are no investments prior to period 1. 
Redistribution of income between industry and agriculture through price supports, export 
subsidies or trade barriers involve deadweight costs. Denote the redistributive policy in period t by 
r, . Further r/ (r, ) is the aggregate net income transfer for sector i resulting from policy r with 
" 
r/ (0) = O. Define r,A (r,) = r, and riB (r, ) =-r, - c(r,), where c() represents the deadweight costs of 
the policy. Hence, policy r, represents the net transfer to agriculture. A positive r, means 
agriculture is subsidized by industry as is so commonly observed in industrial countries. 
Furthermore,assumethat 8c18r, > ofor r, >0,8cI8r, <0 for r, <0,8 2cI8r/ >0 and 8c18r,(0) 
=0. 
Sector i's net income in period t can be summarized by: 
where the second term in the right-hand side represents the impact of research on i's income in the 
previous period. Income generated by public research is defined by the research production function 
f(.). Each sector's share of the benefits derived from public research is represented by pi, with 
PA +PB =1.2 Because each policy has a differential impact on the distribution of income, one 
group's private optimum of the public good differs from the other group. The optimal policy 
combination will depend on the objective function of the government and the constraints facing it. 
• 
2 De Gorter and Zilbennan show that the relative values of ~i (one of which can be negative) depend on the elasticity of 
supply and demand and on the effects of research on agriculture's cost structure. .For example, a large cost reduction in 
agriculture due to research with an inelastic demand could have consumers benefiting more than farmers. 
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In this paper, we evaluate two alternative models: one is the traditional social planner model and the 
other is based on a public choice formulation of government behavior.3 
The Social Optimum 
The optimal policies for a social planner are determined by maximizing a Benthamite utility 
function. We assume that the social planner can use lump-sum transfers to redistribute income, and 
can credibly commit to future policies. The social planner problem is given by: 
[3] max
 
We define the policies {'tIm, 't m, rIm, r m} that solve this problem as the social optimal policy set.2 2 
Optimal research investment in the second period is zero ('t m = 0) because no group benefits. The2
conditions that determine the other social optimal policies are: 
VB('t nl ) U l~ ('t t) - 28U:y ('t ~' )PBI, ('t t)[6]	 It 1 = = 1VA (nI) Ul~ ('t t) - 28U2A/'t t)p A1: ('t ~')1, 1 
where	 U~ =8U: 18y:, V~ =8V/ 18't, and 1: =8118't. 
Condition [4] implies that rIm = 0 and that rt = [(PB- PA)1('t I )]1 2. This means the social 
optimum will have full compensation with unequal distributional effects of research: 
y;(r2n1 ) =y:(rt). We assume here that the social planner can use lump sum (non distortionary) 
transfers to compensate the group that benefits less (or loses from) from research. The social optimal 
• 
3 Throughout the paper we assume that endowment incomes are equal between agriculture and industry. Dropping this 
assumption complicates the analysis, as both optimal redistribution and research, investment are now affected both by 
endowment income differences and by redistributional effects of research investments (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995a). 
However, this complication does not change the main conclusions of this paper. 
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research investment level is between the preferred investment levels of each sector. Only in the 
special case where both sectors benefit equally from research (~A = ~B) will each group's preferred 
investment level coincide with the social optimum (using [4], [5] and [6]): 
The Political Optimum 
A burgeoning literature in political economy specifies a government maximizing some form 
of a political objective function (Hillman; Alesina and Rodrik; Perrson and Tabellini; Rausser). We 
extend the basic Downsian public choice model of Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) by including an 
endogenous public research investment in addition to the redistributive policy.4 The political 
support politicians receive from citizens depends on how each policy affects the economic welfare of 
individuals in each group. Citizens increase their political support if they benefit from the policies 
and reduce support otherwise. Formally, individual political support at time t, S:, is assumed to be a 
strictly concave and increasing function of the policy induced change in welfare: 
The functions Si(.), V i(.), and therefore V i (.), are continuous, at least twice continuously 
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. An important advantage of this specification 
is that it avoids indeterminacy and multiple equilibrium problems which are typical of deterministic 
(0-1) voting models (Mueller; Coughlin) and of multiple policy problems (Mayer and Riezman). 
In order to stay in power, politicians need to obtain a minimum level of political support. 
This depends critically on political institutions that determine the rules of the game for political 
decision-making. Under autocratic political institutions, such as dictatorships, political support from 
a large part of the constituency may not be needed to stay in power. In general, a more democratic 
-
society has more competition between politicians, resulting in politicians giving consideration to the 
4 For an application of this model in analyzing redistributive policies only in agric~lture, see Swinnen (1994). 
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impact on political support from their constituency. Under perfect competition, politicians will 
choose the policy combination {r,·, 't;} that maximizes political support in order to stay in power. 
For our model, this implies the following decision problem for politicians at time t: 
[9] max s/ (r, ,'t , ) +S,B (r, ,'t ,) . 
{r,.T I} 
The policies r,· and 't; that solve this problem are the political optimal policies 5. 
As in the case for the social planner, there are no incentives for the government to invest in 
research in period 2: 't 2*= 0 (= 't;'). 
Consider then the optimality conditions in period 1: 
s)~ (r) *) UI~ (r) *) (1 + cr (r) *))[10] = S)~ (r) *) UI~ (r] *) 
U]~('t) *) - 28 U:/'t I *)~ Bh ('t] *) [11] UI~('t 1*) - 28 U2A/'t I *W A h ('t 1*) 
and for period 2: 
S2~' r2*) U:y(r2*) (1 + cr (r2*))[12] S~.tr2 *) = U//r2*) 
where S:I' =8 S: /a[Vi (r" 't,) - Vi (0,0)]. 
5 In reality, the two policies may be decided by different parts (e.g. administrations) of the government. To capture the 
essence of these features, we assume that agents have perfect information on incentives, costs and benefits. Even if 
different institutions are involved in the decision-making, those institutions do not act independently of one another as 
they take each others actions into account. Our specification is a simplified way of modeling this. 
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Distribution of Research Benefits 
The political optimal policies will depend critically on the distribution of research benefits. 
Proposition 1: Jfthe distribution ofresearch benefits is equal (P A =PB), then support maximizing 
governments will choose the social optimal research investment (r:; = 't ~'), independent of 
credibility constraints or deadweight costs. 
Proof: see appendix. 
There is no incentive for the government to redistribute incomes (recall that each sector 
shares equally in financing the public good investment and that pre-policy endowment incomes are 
equal). Private optimum levels of the public good coincide with the social optimum. 
When research benefits are unequally distributed between groups (for example, when 
industry benefits more from research than agriculture because of declining food prices induced by 
cost-reducing research), governments increase political support by investing at least as much as 
agriculture's preferred level (because both sectors support that). Furthermore, the government will 
never invest more than industry's preferred level, because it would support from both sectors. Thus 
the political optimum <will be between each sector's optimum (as in the social planner's case). 
The optimum is where the marginal increase in support from industry is exactly offset by the 
marginal reduction in agriculture's political support, as indicated by condition [11]. 
Notice, however, that governments use income transfers to compensate the sector that 
benefits less (or loses) from the public good investment. When pA < PB, marginal support levels 
will differ between sectors for the same policy. A group's marginal support decreases when this 
group benefits more from policies, and vice-versa. Hence, the marginal support level will increase 
for those who are being taxed through redistribution, or when the investment level diverges from 
• 
their optimum. The marginal support levels are endogenous in the politician's decision process and 
will be affected by all policies. Consequently, as the ratio of marginal political support levels adjust _ 
with changing investment (in condition [11 D, it will also affect the optimal redistribution levels. In 
this case, it would imply that S,~ / S,~ > 1 as agriculture is benefiting less from research than 
8
 
industry. Condition [10] implies that the government transfers income to agriculture in this case 
(rJo > 0). This result holds in general: the political support mechanism will induce the government 
to compensate the sector that benefits less from research by transferring income to this sector. 
Government Credibility and Deadweight Costs 
To illustrate how government credibility affects the outcome, consider the equilibrium if the 
support maximizing government could credibly commit to implement policies in the next period. 
The condition for optimal redistribution in period 2, r; ,becomes: 
[13] 
Proposition 2: Ifsupport maximizing governments can credibly commit onjuture compensationjor 
unequal distribution ojresearch benefits m:Jd. ifcompensation does not induce deadweight costs, then 
the politically optimal research investment will be the social optimum. 
Proof: see appendix. 
In the absence of deadweight costs, support maximizing governments will fully compensate 
for any unequal distributional effects of research benefits in the period they occur: 
r; =[p A j (-c: )- pB j ('t ; ) ]/2, which implies that post-policy incomes are equal: y ~ (r; ) =y f (r; ) . 
It is important that this future compensation is guaranteed (because we have assumed that 
governments can credibly commit to future policies), as it allows the government to choose the 
social optimal research investment in period 1: 't: ='t r. By transferring income from industry to 
agriculture to compensate for the unequal benefits of research, industry's support for increased 
research declines, because industry now incorporates the politically induced compensation payments 
in its assessment of net changes in income. Similarly, the opposition of agriculture to increasing 
research investment decreases as compensation payments increase. In terms of condition [11], this 
implies that Sl~ / SI~' adjusts so that SI~' = SI~' at the political equilibrium, resulting in equal incomes 
and the social optimal level of the public research investment. 
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If the government cannot credibly commit to full compensation In the future, then the 
outcome is characterized by conditions [10], [11], [12]. Notice that condition [12] implies that the 
government in period 2 is only concerned with income transfers in that period, Since research 
investments have taken place in the previous period, the government takes 't \ as given in period 2. 
Therefore, the marginal support levels will not be affected by 't I , but by r2 only' As a consequence, 
the government will only partially compensate agriculture.6 With negative impacts on income 
having a larger impact on political support than an equal increase in income, the reduction in 
political support of the taxed industry will increasingly offset the increase in political support by 
subsidizing agriculture. The equilibrium will be reached before incomes are equal: 
y: (r2') < y: (r2·). The reason why full compensation resulted with credible commitments was that 
governments internalized both period effects and policies in their calculations. For the first period 
government, second period income transfers are fully endogenous with credible commitments, but 
not without them. Full compensation will always result if income inequality is endogenously 
induced (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995a). 
Economic agents in period 1 fully understand the incentives of the government in period 2. 
Therefore, as agriculture realizes that there will only be partial compensation in period 2, 
agriculture's opposition to period 1 research investment beyond it's preferred level will be higher. 
As a consequence SJ~' > SI~ at ('t ; , r\ =0), This will induce the government to compensate partially 
in advance ('t; > 0 with S\~, > S\~, ) but in equilibrium, it is still the case that 
SII'A (''t\,rl') > SBh' (''tl,r\') such th t a r\• >O','t\ <'t Jm and'r2 <r2m • TheresuIt'IS th t th a egovernment WI'II 
underinvest in research because the sector which benefits less from research is only partially 
compensated and will oppose increases in research investments more than if there was full 
• 
compensation. In general: 
Proposition 3: Ifsupport maximizing governments cannot credibly commit to future compensation 
for the unequal distribution ofresearch benefits, then the politically optimal research investment will 
be less than the social optimum. 
6 Swinnen and de Gorter, 1993, have called this feature the "conservative" characteristic of the political model. 
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Proof: see appendix. 
Proposition 3 holds independent of deadweight costs. It is easy to see from conditions [10], 
[12] and [13] that deadweight costs would increase the marginal burden on industry for 
compensating agriculture for the latter's smaller share of research benefits. This will reduce 
industry's political support even more for a given transfer to agriculture, and bring the optimal 
transfer closer to zero. As a consequence, second period compensation will only be partial, even rIo 
if credible commitments can be made by the government. Again, this results in first period 
compensation and in a lower research investment level. This effect occurs even if the government 
can credibly commit future policies. The general conclusion is: 
Proposition 4: If compensation for unequal distribution of research benefits induces deadweight 
costs, then the politically optimal research investment will be less than the social optimum. 
Proof: see appendix 
There is one more important element to this issue. Thus far, we have assumed that there is no 
direct impact of research on the deadweight costs of the transfer (Bc / 8t =0). In many cases, cost-
reducing research will affect the agricultural supply curve and therefore the deadweight costs of 
market interventions such as price supports, impact tariffs, etc. (Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz). This 
effect will only occur in period 2. Condition [11] then becomes: 
Sl~.('tl*) UI~('tI*)-28U:/'tI*)[ ~Bf,('tl*)-Ct ][14] = ASl~ ('t 1*) Ul~ ('t 1*) - 28 U2/'t I *)p Air ('t 1*) 
where c't = Bc / 8t reflects the additional (second period) effect. 
The research investment may increase or decrease the deadweight costs associated with the 
transfer (i.e., Bc / 8t > 0 or Bc / 8t < 0). The effect depends on how research affects the supply curve • 
and on the redistributive policy instrument (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995b). When research induces 
a parallel shift in the supply curve, Bc / 8t < 0 for most policy instruments. In this case there is an 
11 
additional benefit from research. The effect will mitigate the negative impact of deadweight costs 
and will bring the political optimum closer to the social optimum. This mitigating effect will depend 
on the size of Be / at. Simulations reported in Swinnen and de Gorter (1995b) show that it can bring 
the political optimum very close to the social optimum, but does not fully offset. When research 
induces a pivot in the supply curve and very distortionary transfer policies are used (e.g., an export 
subsidy), then the likelihood increases that Be / at > O. Deadweight costs increase, forcing an 
increase in the gap between the political and social optimum level of research. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper develops a public choice model to show how governments that face political 
constraints diverge from social optimal levels of research investments in agriculture. In our model, 
underinvestment in research occurs even with perfect infonnation, and no transaction costs nor 
deadweight costs of redistributive policy. The key factor is that the benefits from agricultural 
research are unequally distributed. This causes differential political reactions from each group in 
society. Furthennore, the inability of government to commit to future actions leads to a time 
inconsistency problem. Because of government's inability to have credible commitments, only 
partial compensation will occur in response to the unequal benefits from research. The result is 
underinvestment in public research expenditures. Deadweight costs of income redistribution further 
reduces compensation and induces a wider gap between social and political optimal investment 
levels. However, we indicate from previous research that this gap may be reduced if research causes 
a decline in the deadweight cost per unit of transfer. 
• 
Appendix 
Proof ofproposition 1. 
With PA= PB, condition [12] implies that r2• = O. This means that y~(*) = y: (*), which implies 
that U2~(*) = U:/*) in [11]. Then, assume that rl = 0, which makes UI~(*) = UI~(*) in [11], which 
in turn implies that Sl~(*) I SJ~'(*) = 1. All this implies that condition [11] can be written as 
Uli/'t;) = 8U~/or;).!. (or;), which is identical to condition [7] and thus implies that 't; = 't ~'. We 
only need to show further that rj =0 is consistent with the political equilibrium. This can be done by 
substituting 't: = 't ~ , PA = PB and 't; = 0 into condition [10], which gives rl· = O. Q.E.D. 
Proof of proposition 2. 
Introducing rt'=O,r;' = [(pA_pB)f('tn]/2 and 'tt in [10], [11] and [13] shows that 
{r/", r2'" , 't ~'} solve the conditions for {rl·, r2•, 't :} when c(r,) = c, (r, ) =O. Q.E.D. 
Proof of proposition 3. 
Assume. c(r,)=c,(r,)=O. Define k,(r,)=U,~(r,)IU,;(r,) and z,=S~/S,~. From condition [12], 
we know that at r2= 0, S~, =S:" and thus Z2 = 1. Further, U:y < U~ and k2< 1 at 't I > 0 and 
r2=0 for pA< PB. With aZ2 Iar2< 0 and ak2Iar2> 0 , it follows that r2•> O. However, there 
is less than full compensation (y~(r2·»y:(r2·))because z2(r2·)=k2(r2·»I, which implies that 
pBf('t I) - r2• > pAf('t I) + r2• and, hence, that r2• < «P B- PA) I 2)f('t I)' With imperfect 
compensation in the second period, condition [10] implies that kl =1 and ZI > 1 at 't I > 0 and 
rl = O. With akl I arl > 0 and aZI I arl < 0 , it follows that 1). > 0 for pA < PB. Furthermore, it 
must be that ZI (rl·) > 0 at 't I > 0 and thus also at 't; > O. Hence, using this in condition [11] 
•implies that V;~ ('t ; ) + V;: ('t ; ) > O. Comparing this with condition [10] implies that 't; < 't ~. Q.E.D. 
2
 
Proof of proposition 4. 
The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 3. Again we have partial compensation in the second 
period, because with c,(r2 » 0 for in condition [13], it still follows that r • > 0, butr2 > 0 2
y~(r;) < y: (r;). As a consequence Sl~ > SI~ at (rl =0, r2• ,<). Condition [10] implies that rl • > 0 
but also that SI~' > Sl~ at (rl·, r;, 't ;). Using this in condition [11] and comparing with [6] implies 
that 't; < 't ~. Q.E.D. 
•
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